From 1993 to 2002 the emergence of the urban resident Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (MLG) system saw a major reconfiguration and expansion of social assistance in the People's Republic of China.
Introduction
The twin processes of reform and opening up have brought unprecedented wealth to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and improved the lives of millions of people. However, China's economic growth has not been without consequence and increasing urban poverty has been one outcome of reforming China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and planned economy.
In the last twenty years the Chinese government has begun to develop policy responses to increasing urban poverty. The urban resident Minimum Livelihood Guarantee system (zuidi shenghuo baozhang, MLG or dibao hereafter) was one policy response which the Chinese government introduced in an effort to provide for and placate the part of the urban population which has not benefited from the reform process. Between 1993 and 2002 the MLG grew from a policy innovation introduced in the city of Shanghai affecting a few thousand individuals to a national policy providing benefits to over twenty million people. The MLG is a means tested benefit which tops up household income to a locally set level. The policy, as set out in the 1999 MLG regulations (State-Council, 1999) , is funded, administered and adjusted by the local level of government. When compared to the preceding social assistance framework, the Three Nos (sanwu), which paid benefits to those who fell into three specific categories (no career, no parent, no work ability) the MLG can be seen as a radical departure from the preceding policy.
Despite the rapid development from local innovation to national implementation of a radically new method of delivering social assistance to urban residents, little policy analysis has been done on the MLG which has sought to explain the emergence and development of the policy. This is understandable given that the majority of the studies on the MLG come from an economic, sociological or social work background. The concern of the authors is not to discuss theories of policy making or the origins of the MLG in particular. Descriptive studies of the MLG set out the policy and sometimes give an historical review (Leung, 2003 (Leung, , 2006 Leung & Wong, 1999; Saunders & Shang, 2001; Wong & Flynn, 2001; Wong, 1998 Wong, , 2001 ).
These studies have a tendency, because they focus on the efficacy of the MLG, to skirt round explanations of the program's development. For example Leung (2003: 83) writes:
"To establish a last-resort welfare safety net in the cities, the government restructured the traditional social assistance program in 1993, with the aim of extending their coverage, raising the level of benefits and securing financial commitments from the local governments."
The implicit suggestion is that the MLG followed a straightforward development from local initiative to national implementation. This does, however, present the MLG's development as being a simple process which it was not. Rather than focusing on the scope and effectiveness of the MLG this article seeks to explore and offer an explanation for the emergence and development of the program.
There is also work which uses the MLG as a tool that helps measure the difficult question of what constitutes poverty in the People's Republic (ADB, 2004; Saunders & Sun, 2006) . Other studies discuss the MLG as part of the overall social policy provisions of the Chinese state.
Hussain discusses the MLG in terms of its design and potential effectiveness in alleviating poverty (Hussain, 2003) . Solinger discusses the policy as part of an emerging hierarchy of the unemployed in China (Solinger, 2001) . The work of Liu and Wu, Qian and Wong, Wong and Ngok also discuss the MLG within the context of various measures introduced by the state to cope with increasing urban poverty and unemployment (Liu & Wu, 2006; Qian & Wong, 2000; Wong & Ngok, 2006) . Finally in his recent work on the provision of social goods in China, Saich discusses the MLG as part of move toward a standard centralized provision of social assistance (Saich, 2008) .
Although studies of the MLG have focused almost exclusively on the operation and effectiveness of the policy there have been exhaustive policy studies focusing on other areas of China's social security and welfare system. Studies of China's efforts to reform its pension, health and emerging unemployment provisions provide a number of themes which help explain policy developments in the PRC. Reviewing reform of China's social provisions, Gu notes the importance of institutions as an explanatory tool. Gu argues that the problem of providing social goods in 1990s China was a result of previous efforts at reforming the stateowned sector. These reforms undermined the basis of social provisions whilst failing to provide working alternatives (Gu, 2001 ). On pensions both Béland and Yu (2004) and Frazier (2004) note the impact that different interests can have on policy outcomes. They note in particular that decisions on policy can feed back in the formation of new interests which can impede future policy development and implementation. Duckett (2001 Duckett ( , 2003 also highlights the significant role that can be played by established interests in the reform of healthcare provision in the PRC. Béland and Yu, Frazier and Duckett also address the significant impact which the fragmented Chinese state has on social policy in the PRC, providing space for innovations, competing bureaucratic interests, and the challenge of overcoming local government intransigence and misinterpretation of policy (Béland & Yu, 2004; Duckett, 2001 Duckett, , 2003 Frazier, 2004a Frazier, , 2004b . Finally, Solinger (2005) uses feedback in explaining challenges facing China's efforts at dealing with unemployment. Solinger argues that local government actors reverted to previous patterns of administration and prioritizing who to provide for when implementing new measures for newly unemployed workers which does include a brief discussion of the MLG (Solinger, 2005) . The explanation of the MLG presented here contributes to this existing body of policy analysis. This article will complement these studies of social provision in China by arguing that the MLG can be explained through combining concepts regarding the influence of state institutions and policy feedback with our existing understanding of the influence of bureaucratic policy actors in the PRC. The structure of the Chinese state and the complex relationships between different branches of government and different levels of government affected the MLG in two ways. First, state institutions created the space for local level innovation to occur and were therefore a positive influence. Second, conversely, this space also presented challenges to the spread and effective implementation of the MLG. This reflects known features of the Chinese policy process as developed in the work of Lampton, and Lieberthal and Oksenberg for example (Lampton, 1987 (Lampton, , 1992 Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988; Lieberthal, 1992) . Policy feedback is the other area of influence where previous policy decisions constrain the available choices for policy actors and sponsors. Policy feedback is understood here as the constraining of policy choices available as a result of previous policy decisions made (Béland & Yu, 2004; Pierson, 1994 Pierson, , 2004 Skocpol, 1992) . Feedback does not rule out possibilities but it does make certain choices more difficult to make because alternatives become increasingly politically or financially expensive for policy makers.
The role of policy actors is explained through the lens of the rational bureaucrat. This is best developed in Lieberthal and Oksenberg's fragmented authoritarianism model in which they argue that policy development and outcomes reflect the decisions made by these bureaucratic actors who are motivated by rational policy concerns and the desire to build their own organizations up (Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988) When addressing the emergence of the MLG in Shanghai, the space provided by the Chinese state's decentralization of authority was the main factor. Decentralization had both benefitted the city as it pushed ahead with reform and it also created the problem of growing urban poverty. In dealing with increasing poverty Shanghai took advantage of the space decentralization decision making authority and its own fiscal strength to implement the MLG.
There are two conflicting elements as the Shanghai model, as it came to be known, was both a radical policy change but included continuities from the previous system. The changes reflect the pragmatic approach to policy making idealized by the Deng regime at work coupled with the intervention of then Mayor Huang Ju. However, continuities persisted demonstrating the influence of feedback from the traditional Three Nos system. National implementation in 1997 and the subsequent expansion of the MLG are both due to the intervention of particular policy actors in the policy process. The institutional position matters a great deal because the political, fiscal and personnel resources available to an actor have a profound impact not only on the decisions made but also the outcomes.
The MLG from 1993 to 2002
The MLG is a means tested social assistance policy which provides impoverished urban residents with a supplement to their income 3 . The provisions are based on the MLG line (dibao xian), which is calculated locally, with residents applying to their local sub-district (shequ) for the benefit. Residents need to demonstrate that their total household income falls below the MLG line. In order to do this during the application process their intention to receive the MLG is made public and their household as well as income is investigated.
Provided the applicants demonstrate their income is below the MLG line they are then paid a benefit which brings their income up to the MLG line (State-Council, 1997 , 1999 . For example, if the MLG line is set at 150 RMB per person per month and a household of 4 applies for the benefit then the total household income needs to fall below 600 RMB per month. If successful, the benefit provided will bring the household income up to this level.
The intention of the MLG is to provide a minimum subsistence provision to the most impoverished in China's cities and is set intentionally low at around a third of the minimum wage and two thirds the level of unemployment insurance payouts (Saich, 2008 (Shanghai-BCA, 1997) . This early version of the MLG was funded locally through the levying of welfare fees (fuli fei), which were to be paid by enterprises using their own funds (ziyou zijin) (Shanghai-RenminZhengfu, 1996) . The MLG marked a significant change in the provision of social assistance in China at this time because it moved away from the centrally funded, inflexible, category based system of the traditional Three Nos (sanwu) system which provided limited subsidies for those with no caregiver, no income and no ability to work (Linda Wong, 1998) .
In 1994 the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) held its national congress in Beijing; two pronouncements on the MLG at this meeting marked the beginning of the move from local innovation to national policy. In his work report to the congress, then Minister of Civil Affairs
Duoji Cairang (Duoji, 1995a ) stated that the MCA should "…target urban social assistance through the progressive introduction of local minimum livelihood guarantee relief." This was the first indication by a central level government official that the MLG should be implemented in any cities beyond Shanghai. Minister Duoji's statement was supported later in the congress during then Premier Li Peng's speech which emphasized the need for reform in the social assistance system (P. Li, 1995) . After the congress, the MLG began to spread to other cities but the spread, as can be seen in Figure 1 , was not significant. Where it has been possible to discern the geographical spread of the MLG it appears to have initially been implemented in the more developed and larger cities. Most of these were in the east of the country such as Guangdong, Beijing, Dalian, Wuhan, Qingdao, or Xiamen (Duoji, 1998a (Duoji, 1998b; Fan, 1998; B. Li, 1998; G. Li, 1998a G. Li, , 1998b Zou, 1998 Republic (Fan, 2000) . At this point the MLG was operating in 2310 cities across China six years after the policy had initially appeared in Shanghai (Duoji, 2001b) .
By 1999 the MLG had a clear objective in the provision of a subsistence standard of living for urban residents, and a standard administrative and financial basis -following what become known as the Dalian model of sub-district (shequ) administration supported by local government financing (Duoji, 1998a) . The policy saw a number of significant developments.
As can be seen in Figures Reforming the existing social assistance system became part of the Shanghai government agenda in the second half of 1992 (Shi, 2002) . Concerns coalesced around the combination of forthcoming reforms to the textile and steel industries which expected to produce a significant surge in unemployed and laid-off workers (Interviews TJ06-1, BJ07-1); rising costs for everyday goods in particular foodstuffs (Yang, 2003) ; the perception that the current social assistance system could not cope with China's developing economy or the growing number of poor outside the system (Tang, 1998 (Tang, , 2003 ; and the fear that enterprise reforms might produce social instability similar to that experienced in the north east of China (Interview TJ06-1)(A. P. L. Liu, 1996) . Led by Mayor Huang Ju and a committee chaired by the Shanghai Bureau of Civil Affairs (BCA) various policy measures were proposed in reports which focused on three groups under no jurisdiction (the san bu guan) which included elderly with caregivers but no support, workers with no work unit, and families of workers who had died or injured (Shi, 2002) . In early 1993 agreement was reached, with Mayor Huang Ju apparently playing a significant role (Interviews TJ06-1, BJ07-1), on a two-branch approach to potential problems. The MLG was to be implemented in combination with a minimum wage system across the city which, together, would address problems faced by workers and the retired who fell into each of the three problem groups identified (Shi, 2002; Tang, 2003; Yang, 2003 ).
Shanghai's position in the state hierarchy was a significant factor in contributing to the agenda on social assistance and creating the space for innovations in policy to occur. because neither out-ranks the other; in these scenarios a higher-ranked unit might be called in to act as arbiter (Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988) . Shanghai is classified as a zhixiashi rank city which literally translates as municipality but has been referred to as a "named city" amongst other titles (Lieberthal, 1995) , here referred to as municipalities. Currently the cities enjoying this rank are Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing, all of which are large cities in terms of administrative area, population, economic output and political influence. The important point is that this ranking places the municipalities on an equal level with the provinces and central government ministries when it comes to policy making and implementation as well as control over their own budget. The only bodies ranked higher are commissions, the Ministry of Finance (in practice if not formally) and finally the State
Council. This position in the structure of the state means that cities like Shanghai enjoy a degree of flexibility when it comes to policy making.
Shanghai's position in the state structure manifested itself in the development of the MLG.
First, Shanghai was one of the more advanced cities in China and was facing the benefits and pressures of reform before other areas (Interview BJ06-3). Pressures manifested in increasing cost of living for residents, especially in food prices (Yang, 2003) , and increasing numbers of people falling outside of the traditional social and economic system because reforms of SOEs (Interviews TJ06-1 and BJ07-1). Shanghai, however, was also in an advantageous position because it was benefitting from reform. When the MLG was being developed in Shanghai, the city was extremely wealthy in comparison to other Chinese cities. The city was averaging Shanghai was relatively incident-free whilst the dongbei region suffered a spate of protests (Liu, 1996) . Third, Shanghai could act with a degree of independence because of its status and fiscal strength as a municipality (Interview TJ06-3). Finally, Shanghai could act because it had the political status to do as it pleased due to connections between the national and Shanghai's ruling elites, notably Jiang Zemin (Interview HK06-2).
The emergence of the MLG in Shanghai can only in part be explained by the actions of a few key policy actors. Whilst the reason for the policy being seen as necessary was ultimately due to growing concerns over the political impact urban residents who fell outside of the traditional social assistance might have this does not fully explain why the policy emerged in (Shi, 2002) , the policy was totally inflexible. If a household or individual was outside the work unit system and impoverished, but not one of the Three Nos, then they were not entitled to relief. Until the late 1980s this was a problem in theory only as the system acted in concert with the work-based provisions of the work unit. Only when the reforms of enterprises and employment began to deepen in the post-Southern Tour climate of 1992 did the issue manifest. At this point there were impoverished groups that the system did not cater to; such as the san bu guan identified in Shanghai. The Three Nos was failing to accommodate the changing welfare structure at the same time that funding limitations meant that it was failing to offer adequate provisions to the groups it did target (Tang, 1998 (Tang, , 2001 ).
The Three Nos was a failing policy in the early 1990s because of a combination of changing circumstances and a very rigid design. The legacy of the work unit in local government structure also shows feedback in that it is a continuation of older problematic systems, in spite of some significant policy changes. Unlike the later iterations of the MLG, the Shanghai model had a role for the work units and their enterprises in helping to administer the policy and finance the MLG (ShanghaiRenminZhengfu, 1996) ; in the iteration of the MLG which was rolled out nationwide in 1997 work units were not involved in the policy at all. The decision to use work units was explained by a Chinese researcher as being an efficient choice at the time (Interview TJ06-1), as the work units were a powerful administrative tool in the early 1990s. At this time work units would have been a familiar option for policy makers seeking mechanisms capable of providing administrative and financial assistance. The shequ (community or sub-districts) which would be used later to administer the MLG were still being established as an informal administrative unit. The street and residents committees were also used as part of the overall administrative structure for the MLG in concert with the work units. A local initiative would have to be funded locally, and the enterprises in Shanghai provided an obvious means to raise that revenue.
The interesting, and contradictory, point is that although category-based targets do exist in the MLG they are not the means by which benefit entitlement is decided, which is a means test based on the total household income. The means test in theory remedies the major problems of inflexibility due to the exclusive focus on categories that the Three Nos presented. By having a means tested mechanism the MLG would be open to everyone who fell within its definition of poor. In Pierson's concept of feedback in policy choice the means test constitutes a clear break with previous practice in spite of strong tendency toward familiar if ineffective mechanisms of providing social assistance (Pierson, 1994 (Pierson, , 2004 ).
This change in policy path highlights the alternatives which were considered. In its work report to Mayor Huang Ju in early 1993 the BCA suggested a continuation of category-based provisions. The BCA program would have catered to, for example, the elderly with family, and therefore potential caregivers, but with low incomes and no active caregiver by creating a special fund to distribute benefits. The policy suggested in the report, "View regarding resolving elderly residents in our city facing livelihood difficulties" (Guanyu jiejue benshi shiqu bufen laonianren shenghuo kunnande yijian) (Shi, 2002) , would have resulted in a continuation of the Three Nos system in terms of administration and basic principles. This suggests two points; first, as seen in the local Civil Affairs policy proposal feedback from previous practice in the policy process was very strong. Second, once the decision to break from previous practice was made, the options opened up meant that a means-tested choice became viable.
This pragmatic response to the problems created by the previous system extended into other areas of the design of the MLG. Responding to the problem of the Three Nos stagnation and inflexibility the MLG had some specific design features. The inclusion in the MLG of local funding and adjustment mechanisms which would respond to price changes reflected problems with the Three Nos subsidy. Actual subsidies available to Three Nos recipients stagnated due to the lack of funding increases and the lack of adjustment for subsidies during the reform period (Duoji, 2001a; Tang, 1998) . The rejection of the preceding system influenced the choices available to policy makers in Shanghai. The same process which led to means testing also encouraged the introduction of local funding provisions and price related adjustment mechanisms. This meant that the MLG could be more responsive to economic development and price changes than its predecessor.
This attempt to decisively break with the traditional Three Nos social assistance system can be explained by two factors. First, as noted the policy agenda and decision to reform social assistance was based on perceived failings in the traditional system. By choosing to introduce a locally based means tested program, the policy process arguably operated as it was intended to. Both Chinese officials and researchers commented on how the MLG carried design elements which responded to specific problems in the traditional system (Interviews TJ06-1, BJ07-1 and BJ07-3). Second, in interviews with Chinese researchers close to the Shanghai policy process, Mayor Huang Ju was highlighted as having a significant role in guiding design decisions. His comments at meetings and in reports were noted as a key part of the MLG's development and help explain the radical departure from the traditional system or a similar system as envisaged by the local Civil Affairs Bureau (Interviews TJ06-1 and BJ07-1).
In the following two sections we will see further evidence of the dramatic impact actor interventions can have on policy outcomes on a much wider scale.
Interestingly, the later version of the MLG which was implemented nationwide in 1997 did not include a financial or administrative role for enterprises. Changes during the expansion of the MLG reflected China's efforts to reform and extricate the social welfare system from the enterprises. The central government in the late 1990s did not want enterprises to continue providing social goods, and the move away from the work units in the 1997 Circular reflects this. MLG management became the responsibility of local government through newly established sub-districts, which are not officially part of the government but typically carry out work on behalf of the state (Derleth & Koldyk, 2004) . In other areas such as pensions and health, pooling of resources and insurance were introduced in an effort to break reliance on enterprises (Duckett, 2001; Duckett, 2003; Frazier, 2004a Frazier, , 2004b . Wong also highlights this process in social welfare provisions, although in this case the basic level of administration was seen as a means to replace services rather than just administer new state measures (Wong, 1998) . This move away from reliance on enterprises in the MLG was therefore not an isolated move but reflects a new policy path by the Chinese state.
In addition the emergence of the sub-districts as a new form of delivering local government neatly paralleled the corresponding move away from the work unit as the main unit of social control and policy provision in urban Chinese society. The process surrounding a particular policy is not a simple process and nor is it independent of changes in the wider political, social and economic environment. The changes to the MLG during nationwide expansion appear to be reflections of wider policy changes in China.
National Implementation and actor intervention
The structure of the state and policy feedback explains the initial emergence and design of the Duoji was particularly active in meetings within the MCA giving speeches which justified the need for the MLG and exhorting cities to implement the MLG. This had the dual effect of keeping the MLG on the agenda whilst also pushing the implementation of the policy forward. The main challenge facing efforts to spread the MLG was the resistance of local governments who were being asked to adopt a policy with no financial help from the centre.
There were four specific problems highlighted by Duoji facing the MLG between 1994 and 1996. The first problem was that the MLG was perceived by some in the local Bureau of Civil Affairs (BCA) as not being the responsibility of the MCA. Second, the MLG was too much work and too troublesome to be a worthwhile investment of resources for local government and the BCA. Third, it was a new policy that had no guidelines, regulations and was unfamiliar. This is an interesting issue because typically policy, when announced, would come with a corresponding set of objectives and methods. In the case of the MLG this material was conspicuous by its absence until 1997. Finally, the policy was viewed as being inappropriate to certain areas in terms of their development (Duoji, 1998d) .
As a minister in a relatively resource-poor ministry Duoji was without the ability to find or allocate resources to support the implementation of the MLG. Instead Duoji had to rely on his personal political clout and ability to negotiate obstruction to the policy. Duoji's support of the MLG was therefore characterized by justifications for implementing the MLG and countering objections to the policy. The arguments used by Duoji had three strands and appeared in many of his speeches on the subject. First, Duoji tied the MLG to three core aspects of the PartyState's policy aims at the time. The MLG was connected to the objective of ensuring continued social stability as it would counter unhappiness with the state that might emerge from impoverished households (Duoji, 1995b (Duoji, , 1998d . It was also presented as a policy which tied into the Party-State's responsibilities to the urban poor and would therefore benefit all involved as it would encourage positive perceptions of the government (Duoji, 1998a (Duoji, , 1998d .
Finally, the policy was tied to the continuation of the reform project by providing social stability and, therefore, was linked to arguably the core policy concept of the post-Mao era.
The MLG was indicated as a policy that both guaranteed the continuation of the reform process and also an indication of China's development. Using other countries social assistance policies as the basis, Duoji made the point that MLG-type policies were a global standard amongst developed nations and something that China should aspire to (Duoji, 1995b (Duoji, , 1998d .
By configuring the debate surrounding the MLG in such a way Duoji ensured that resisting the MLG for whatever reason would be unlikely as it would be the equivalent of questioning core Party-State doctrine.
Second, the arguments that the MLG was outside the responsibility of the MCA, the argument that the policy would create additional work and was too troublesome were countered together. This counter-argument was based around the previous MCA commitment to urban social assistance through the "Three Nos" policy. Essentially the MCA already had responsibility for the poorest and most vulnerable in China's cities and the MLG was, therefore, not a extension of responsibility but a continuity. In addition, the MLG was presented as a reform of the Three Nos policy rather than a new policy in its own right (Duoji, 1995b (Duoji, , 1998d .
Third and finally, dealing with the developmental suitability of different localities a more practical compromise was established. Implementation was staggered nationally in order to allow under developed areas time to adapt to implementing the MLG. Focus was put on those cities seen as developed -predominantly on the Eastern Seaboard and the larger cities equal to provincial rank of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing (the zhixiashi level cities).
Those cities labeled as under developed, mainly in the Central-West of the country, were permitted to follow later when circumstances would allow it (Duoji, 1995b (Duoji, , 1998c Xi, 1998) .
There was no specific articulation of what motivated Minister Duoji to support the MLG out forward in either the documentary sources or during interviews. There are three possibilities which can be inferred from speeches given and the political situation in the PRC at the time.
First, there is what has become one of the core justifications for the MLG, providing a means to ensure social stability by providing a minimum standard of life for the urban poor. This is a strong theme running through Duoji's speeches and politically it would have been a motivator for Chinese leaders in the years after Tiananmen. Second, a rational self interested approach would suggest that Duoji was seeking to strengthen the MCA through adopting a new policy.
In retrospect drawing such a conclusion is tempting but I would caution against it. Although the MLG has gone on to become a prestige policy which attracts central budget allocations this was not the case in the early to mid 1990s. It could be viewed as having been the reverse given the policy relied on local compliance and financing. What Duoji was pushing for, implementation of a policy with no resources to support it, would have made compliance extremely problematic. As Frazier notes when discussing pension reform by the central government, even when it has significant political authority, cannot expect compliance when it announces "unfunded mandates" (Frazier, 2004b) . Finally, there is a strong ideological theme in the speeches of Duoji where justification for the MLG is tied to the Communist system. The MLG was put forward as a means to demonstrate the state's care for the people (Duoji, 1998d) and establish a policy that would reflect well on the Chinese reform project in an international setting (Duoji, 1995b) . The MLG presented here is a tool which strengthens the legitimacy of the status quo and supports the people. Politically Duoji presents the MLG as an almost perfect policy for the Communist Party.
Duoji was acting from a constrained position and this had a significant impact on the development of the MLG. The position of Minister confers significant political power over policy in a particular area but is also limited by the resources available to that particular ministry. In the case of Duoji this meant his options for supporting the MLG were limited because of the relatively poor resources available to the MCA (Linda Wong, 1998). As a minister, Duoji was unable to order local government to implement the MLG and could not divert resources to offer an incentive to carry out the program. This meant that when trying to promote the MLG Duoji had to rely on tailoring the policy to suit local government and persuade them to adopt the policy; this led to a relatively small scale level of implementation toward the end of 1995. The other major outcome of this sponsorship was an uneven national implementation and some local variations in financing and coverage within the core concept of the MLG policy. Variations were allowed, provided the core concept of a means-tested, locally administered and funded measure to provide subsistence subsidies to the urban poor was followed. This can be put down to the fairly relaxed response to concerns over a lack of regulations. This in combination with the specifics of local circumstances led to variations emerging in the MLG in different parts of the PRC. Duoji's institutional position therefore meant his support of the MLG had a number of unintended outcomes.
The support of Li Peng becomes apparent in documentary sources from 1996 and in interviews with Chinese policymakers where Li was identified as being fundamentally important to the development of the MLG. Premier Li backed the MLG as early as 1994 at the same conference that Duoji suggested the policy should be implemented nationally, but it was in 1996 that his influence became significant. At this point the MLG had spread to a small number of cities but was still significantly short of national implementation. During 1996 the MLG was made part of the 9 th Five Year Plan (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) and the 2010 Long Term Development Goals (NPC, 1998). In addition there was a noticeable increase in the number of cities implementing the policy. In 1997 the national implementation of the MLG was announced and specific details of how the policy was to be implemented were detailed in the "State Council Circular Regarding Establishing a National Urban Resident MLG System" (State-Council, 1997). It was during these developments that Premier Li sponsored the MLG and pushed the policy beyond the difficult position it had been in up until this point.
The tools used by Premier Li to support the MLG were much the same as those used by Duoji
Cairang. Speeches given on the MLG (Duoji, 1998c; P. Li, 1995 P. Li, , 1998a P. Li, , 1998b P. Li, , 1998c and comments recorded in meetings (Duoji, 1998c; P. Li, 1998a) promoted the MLG to central and local government. In addition the use of legislative institutions as noted above (P. MCA, 1998; NPC, 1998) Daily (Duoji, 1998e) . Premier Li was associated with the MLG and took action on the policy before this meeting took place, whereas in the case of other elite leaders such as General Secretary Jiang Zemin the only documented speech on the policy was after the meeting (Jiang, 1998) .
As with the case of Duoji Cairang Li's motives are very difficult to determine beyond making inferences. There are four possible reasons why the elite leadership might have swung behind the MLG at this particular time. First, Li Peng had expressed his support for reform of the social assistance system and the MLG from as early as 1994 (P. Li, 1995) . Premier Li received reports on the policy (Interview BJ06-2) and at certain points did take an active hand demanding further implementation (Duoji, 1998c) . Second, the policy success was being reported up the bureaucracy through research reports and work meetings held by the MCA. In addition the MCA was actively reporting on the MLG as part of its routine responsibilities to the State Council. Premier Li was specifically mentioned by MCA officials as having responded favorably to these reports (Interviews BJ06-2; TJ06-1 and BJ07-1). This meant that the elites would have been aware of a successful policy and receiving regular information on it. Third, a departmental head in the MCA reported that the State Council was encouraged by the Ministry already working towards some means to ensure national implementation (Interview BJ07-3). This would suggest that it was not only on the agenda being put to elite leaders but that in terms of implementation there was already a ministry fully supporting the policy and a certain amount of the required work already done.
Finally, 1996 saw the proposal of further reforms to the state-owned enterprise sector and increased concerns over the possible impact on social stability that further reform might have.
Concerns were especially focused on laid-off workers The support of the MLG between 1994 and 1997 by Duoji and Li highlights a number of issues that need to be considered when explaining the development of a policy. Of particular note is that the institutional position a policy actor occupies will have a significant impact on 4 "Laid-off" workers refers to those former employees of state-owned enterprises who were not formally unemployed but at the same time no longer worked for their enterprises. Instead they continued to have some formal ties to their enterprise, for example through welfare provisions and received a special benefit from the government called the Laid-off Worker Basic Living Guarantee. The decision to lay off workers was seen as a means to cushion the blow of rationalizing China's large state owned sector in the late 1990s. The alternative would have been to make this large number of workers unemployed which would have been a significant political risk. For more on laid-off workers (Cai, 2006) . the development of a policy. This is because the actor's position influences what resources and institutions they will have access to. This is hinted at in the fragmented authoritarianism model, although Lieberthal and Oksenberg's argument, focused on US bureaucrats, implies that there are always resources to be bargained over when deciding and implementing policy (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988) . This case highlights the impact that a lack of resources can have as well as the opposite. Although Minister Duoji actively sought the national adoption of the MLG, his politically and financially limited position meant that he was only able to make limited progress towards this goal. In comparison, Premier Li was able to use his access and influence over China's legislative and executive institutions to ensure that the MLG was 
Explaining national expansion of the MLG through actor intervention
The final point in the development of the MLG that this article will discuss is the significant example of how China's social welfare should be delivered through the community rather than tied to enterprises (Tang, 2003) . This comment was the result of problems in delivering welfare to workers who had been laid off by their enterprises. Payments destined for these workers, a temporary measure designed to absorb any protest that might result from the shock of becoming effectively unemployed, had instead been absorbed by cash-strapped enterprises to pay for other commitments. This problem was labeled "debt conflict"; the lack of such a conflict in the MLG which made it attractive to Zhu as a means to resolve the problem of delivering some form of subsidy to laid-off workers (Interviews BJ07-1; BJ07-2; and BJ07-3). In the case of Zhu and the expansion of the MLG the motivations for why action was taken are very clear.
This focus on laid-off workers saw the release and guarantee of funds from the central budget from 2000 onward; this required a considerable amount of political authority given that agreement would be required from the State Council as well as compliance from the Ministry of Finance. In addition the money would need to be found from somewhere, which implies a degree of oversight and authority.
Premier Zhu was responsible for pushing the idea of using the MLG to resolve the laid-off worker problem and releasing the required funding, although exactly how he went about doing this is not particularly clear. The information available from interviews implies that Zhu's support of the MLG shares similarities with that of Duoji and Li. His motivation was a mixture of the political and personal, leading to a sustained interest in a policy over a period of time. Zhu's interest also highlights the significant impact that a policy actor from the elite tiers of government can have in China. The direction of massive financial resources and guarantee of continued support mean that the expansion of the MLG by 10 million recipients was accomplished within a few years. Zhu also highlights the role a sponsor plays, straddling multiple stages of a policy development as he set the agenda, was the decision-maker, and was subsequently active throughout the implementation of the campaign to expand the MLG.
Addressing Local Government as an Actor
Local government has a significant role to play in both the development and also in the implementation of a new policy. Studies of pension and healthcare reform have highlighted the importance of local government (Duckett, 2001; Duckett, 2003; Frazier, 2004a Frazier, , 2004b ; so it is in the case of the MLG.
Although it is difficult to generalize about as broad a collection of different actors as "local government", there are a two points that can be made. Typically local government can be seen to have a dual role when it comes to the development and implementation of new policy measures. By taking advantage of space in China's fragmented political system, local government can introduce new policy and support the wider adoption of particular programs.
This positive role was clearly played by the Shanghai government when it developed and implemented the MLG in the early 1990s. In addition, the early spread of the MLG, although supported and pushed by Duoji Cairang, can be seen as a limited success only because of local government adopting the measure in the period before 1997. In contrast, this space also provides local government the opportunity to obstruct and misinterpret policy. The MLG was particularly susceptible to this negative role during the early period of its development when Duoji struggled to overcome local government intransigence to adopting a policy with no resource support. Only the intervention of the elite with significant political authority and access to resources, in this case Li Peng and Zhu Rongji, was this problem resolved although this ultimately came at the cost of the local character of the MLG.
There are two observations which can be made based on the experience of the MLG and local government. First, local government has its own agenda, which needs to be viewed as separate from both individual elite leaders and the needs of particular bureaucratic organizations. Second, the problem of "unfunded mandates" in the implementation of social policy in China is significant (Frazier, 2004b) . These observations support the conclusions drawn by other studies of social policy reform in China (Béland & Yu, 2004; Duckett, 2001; Duckett, 2003; Frazier, 2004a Frazier, , 2004b . In the case of the MLG the problem of local implementation was only satisfactorily resolved when the laid-off worker problem was reaching a critical point for local government and Premier Zhu's intervention saw a significant commitment to immediate and future funding.
Conclusion
The emergence and eventual implementation of the MLG marked a significant change in the objectives and delivery of urban social assistance in the PRC. Whilst this has been reflected in a large number of studies on China's social assistance, actual explanation for the MLG's emergence and subsequent development has been lacking. The current literature, with the exception of Solinger (2005) , focuses on the efficacy of the program. This article has sought to provide an explanation for the emergence and development of the MLG during the period 1993 to 2002. In this article four particular aspects of the emergence and implementation of the MLG were identified and discussed in order to help explain the development of China's urban social assistance reform. These were why the policy emerged in Shanghai; why the MLG was designed in the way it was; why the transition from local to national policy had the character it did; and finally why the policy expanded after 2000.
The early emergence and development of the MLG highlights in particular the importance of understanding institutional elements when explaining policy in the PRC. The emergence of the MLG in Shanghai highlights the important role that the structure of the state can play in creating the space and setting for new policy to emerge. Decentralization in China allows local government the space to innovate on policy problems and this can lead to the emergence of policy innovations. In the early 1990s Shanghai was facing the dual challenge of reforms:
the city was benefitting in terms of revenue from a growing economy but the local government also realized that pending enterprise reforms and increases in the cost of living meant that social instability was a real possibility. Taking advantage of the space and fiscal strength decentralization provided, Shanghai was able to introduce the MLG. The traditional social assistance system was also significant during this period influencing the agenda and choices for policymakers. The failings of the traditional social assistance system helped set the agenda because the existing system could not cope with the rapid changes reform was bringing. In the design of the MLG there was a dual influence. On the one hand the MLG reflected feedback in highlighting the traditional targets of social assistance even though this was not a necessary design requirement. In addition the use of traditional but problematic administrative units, in this case the work units, also reflected the influence of previous long standing practice. On the other hand the introduction of means testing, local financing, and locally set and adjusted benefits reflected the choice by policy makers to follow a different path than that of the traditional system. These contributions support the findings of policy studies which have addressed other social policy reforms in China (Béland & Yu, 2004; Duckett, 2001; Duckett, 2003; Frazier, 2004a Frazier, , 2004b Solinger, 2005) . There are two final points to make; first, the case of the MLG suggests that the use of institutions is a useful conceptual tool to use in conjunction with our current understanding of the bureaucracy in the PRC building on the work of Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988) . Who makes decisions is important but it is also important to consider where they make those decisions from. Second, it supports the synthesis approach highlighted in a number of policy studies publications. As Béland and Yu (2004) suggest we should not discuss policy developments with institutions and actors separately because they are tied together as part of a single, messy, process.
